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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060006-CA
vs.
PAUL N. CHPJSTENSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Paul Christensen had just lost almost an inch of his finger when he arrived at the
L.D.S. Hospital Emergency Room covered in blood. His eyes were almost swollen shut,
having been "drenched" with mace. Rl55:55, 115, 144, 157-58. He was seeking medical
treatment. Id. If he had been seeking a fight, he would have gone elsewhere.
Christensen was visibly upset and anxious to see a doctor. He was described as loud and
belligerent and rude. Medical personnel also described Christensen as being in shock,
irrational, hallucinating, and psychotic. R155:65-6, 106, 117-18. As the trial court noted,
based just on the evidence presented by the City, Christensen appeared to be suffering
from a mental illness. R155: 205. Something was obviously wrong. Id.
First and foremost, this case is about Paul Christensen. He was charged with
crimes for conduct that occurred while he was under the stress and shock of a substantial

and emotionally devastating bodily injury for which he was seeking treatment. And
because of his agitated behavior, that treatment was denied to him for several hours.
R155:155. Medical personnel testified that he was demonstrating compelling signs of
mental illness when he was grabbed by the same arm of his injury and when he reacted to
that occurrence. R155:100, 106, 117-18. He was charged with crimes for that reaction.
When IHC's private security guard, Thomas Vu, grabbed Christensen by his left
arm, Christensen purportedly swung his right arm toward Vu but did not strike him. For
this act, Christensen was charged with assault on a peace officer. Vu wore his Salt Lake
City police uniform when he restrained Christensen to, according to Vu's testimony,
facilitate Christensen's treatment.
The City's premise that Christensen takes the position that off-duty officers can
never be said to act within the scope of their authority as peace officers, is erroneous.
Thus, the City misconstrues the issue and applies an incorrect standard. It relies on nonbinding, obscure, and irrelevant precedent while ignoring Utah precedent directly on
point. The City further ignores Officer Vu's own testimony that he was fulfilling his
duties within the scope of his private employment for IHC when the incident occurred.
The City also fails to meet its burden of demonstrating that Christensen was not
prejudiced by the prosecutor's misstatement of the law that Christensen's mental state
was no defense to the charges. Moreover, the City's own arguments demonstrate that
Christensen's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this misstatement and for
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failing to investigate or present a mental illness defense and attendant jury instruction.
The City also ignores or minimizes its own evidence that Christensen was suffering from
a mental illness at the time of the events in this case, but rather seeks to qualify itself as a
mental health expert in evaluating Christensen's mental state at the time of the events.
ARGUMENT
I.

OFFICER VU WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT FOR IHC.
In its brief, the premise of the City's argument is flawed. It erroneously

concludes, "The thrust of appellant's argument seems to be that since Officer Vu was offduty, he cannot have been acting within the scope of his authority as a police offer when
he was assaulted." BRIEF OF APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") at 9. This has never been
Christensen's position so the City's arguments and conclusions are incorrect. See, BRIEF
OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt.") 20, fn. 9.1
As noted in Christensen's opening brief, the issue here is not whether Vu was
on- or off-duty. Rather, at issue is whether Vu was acting "within the scope of his
*"It is not Christensen's position that an officer must be on duty to be acting within
the scope of his authority. An off-duty peace officer can act within the scope of his
authority if he finds himself in an emergency situation where enforcement of the law is
necessary. See, Alvarado v. City of Dodge City, supra (holding that an off-duty police
officer working as a private security guard acted under color of state law when he
displayed his badge and arrested a suspected shoplifter). However, if he is performing
duties for a private employer, he is not acting within the scope of his authority as a peace
officer. See, Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445
Mass. 745, 752 (Mass. 2006) ('[P]rivately employed security guards engage in functions
that are different from those performed by ordinary police officers')."
3

authority as a peace officer." Br. Appt. 13; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4. Christensen
does not now and never has taken the position that an off-duty officer cannot perform acts
within the scope of his or her authority as a peace officer.
Thus, the City misconstrues the issue and applies an incorrect standard. Citing
at length an obscure and non-binding case from the Nebraska Court of Appeals2 (Br.
Appe.10-15, 20), the City ignores conflicting and binding Utah precedent instructing that
when considering whether acts occur within the scope of a peace officer's authority, "the
test is whether an officer is doing what he or she was employed to do or is engaging in a
personal frolic of his [or her] own." State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991).
This is the simple test that the trial court should have applied and did not, and the only
test that applies in this case. And here, Vu did what IHC employed him to do.
The best evidence in this fact specific and simple analysis of which employment
responsibilities Vu was engaged in at the time of the incident comes from Vu himself.
Vu "grabbed [Christensen] by his left arm to take him under control... because he
needed to be seen [by a doctor]. . . for his hand" (R155:60, 77, 99). Vu was not enforcing
the law; he was facilitating medical treatment. Rl55:60, 77, 99. Therefore, Vu acted
within the scope of his private employment, i.e., his personal frolic, and was not acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer.
Vu did not place Christensen under arrest. Rl55:60, 77, 99. Indeed,
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State v. Wilen, 539 N.W.2d 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
4

Christensen had not committed any crime when he was grabbed. Rl55:71-3. Therefore,
when Vu first touched Christensen, it is undisputed that Vu was not responding to a crime
and there was no law enforcement purpose behind that act. Vu was acting in his capacity
as a hospital security guard trying to calm a patient, a duty that fell squarely within the
scope of that private employment. Indeed, Vu's only intent and purpose was to perform
his duties for IHC so Christensen could be treated for his injury. Rl55:60, 74, 77, 99.
Throughout the subsequent events, that intent and purpose never changed. Id In other
words, Vu never changed his role from a private employee to a public servant.
The City simply ignores these dissonant facts while concurring that analysis of
"scope of authority" hinges upon whether acts occur when an officer is carrying out his
duties as a peace officer and not whether he is wearing his police uniform or if he is onor off-duty.3 However, ignoring facts does not change them, and the City's own
arguments undermine its position.
Moreover, the analysis does not change in the hypothetical scenario posed by the
City. Br. Appe. 19. If an off-duty officer happened to be in an emergency room while a
robbery or theft was taking place and the officer acted to enforce the law or to place a
suspect under arrest, he would be acting within the scope of his authority as a peace
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See, Br. Appe. 16-17 ("it is the nature of the acts performed and not whether the
officer is on or off duty, in or out of uniform, which determines whether the officer is
engaged in the performance of his official duties"; citing Tapp v. State, 406 N.E.2d 296
(Ind.Ct.App. 1980)).
5

officer. On the other hand, if he acted as Vu testified he did in this case to assist a nurse
and others in restraining and calming an irrational and hallucinating patient so he could
receive medical treatment, he would perform no law enforcement function.4
The City makes several additional arguments (Br. Appe. 20-23) that are
irrelevant under the fact specific analysis that must be applied in this case. See, State v.
Gardiner, supra.5 The City implies that Vu was "carrying out official duties" (Br. Appe.
23) when the incident in this case occurred. However, again, not only does the City fail
to demonstrate how Vu was carrying out official law enforcement duties while he was
acting in his capacity as a privately-employed security guard, but it fails to acknowledge
the evidence, including Vu's own testimony, to the contrary. Rl55:60, 74, 77, 99.
Based on the foregoing facts and analysis, Vu was not acting within the scope of
his authority as a peace officer when he acted to facilitate Christensen's treatment.
Accordingly, Christensen's conviction for assault on a peace officer should be vacated.
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The City "suggests that if this were a civil tort action . . . appellant would likely be
strenuously arguing that Officer Vu was carrying out his official duties as a peace officer
and thus acting within the scope of his authority . . . so as to join a second deep-pocket
employer . . ." Br. Appe. 21. Assuming arguendo this statement is true, it is at best only
half right and somewhat disingenuous. If this were indeed a civil tort action, the City
would no doubt be strenuously arguing that Officer Vu was not acting within the scope of
his authority as a peace officer when he grabbed Christensen by his injured arm so
Christensen could receive treatment for his injury. Rl55:74.
5

The City erroneously refers to Vu's conduct as "perfecting the arrest of appellant"
(Br. Appe. 22). It is unclear how the City gained this misperception of the evidence
because Vu testified that he never placed Christensen under arrest nor did he have any
intent to do so. R155: 60, 74, 77, 99.
6

II.

THE CITY IGNORES ITS OWN EVIDENCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS,
FAILS TO ARGUE THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL; AND ITS OWN ARGUMENTS SUPPORT
CHRISTENSEN'S CLAIM THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE.
By and large, the City's own witnesses who had significant medical training and

experience testified that Christensen was in medical shock, not in his right mind, was
hallucinating, and was psychotic to such an extent that those symptoms standing alone
warranted medical treatment. R155: 55, 57, 65, 96, 100, 106, 108-10, 117-19, 129, 145,
147, 158-60, 164. Yet the City claims, "There is no evidence in the record to suggest
[Christensen] was mentally ill" when the incident occurred. Br. Appe. 25. This claim is
obviously not true. The record speaks for itself. However, the City's false premise
underlies and thus defeats its own arguments.
The City refuses to acknowledge its own evidence and then seeks to qualify
itself as an expert on mental illness. Br. Appe. 25-26. The City minimizes the medical
terms of shock, psychosis, and hallucinations as used by trained medical professionals
who were describing Christensen's mental state while under oath. Therefore, the City
minimizes its own evidence, claiming those terms unfavorable to its position were used
"casually" and in a "colloquial" sense.
There is not one iota of evidence in the record to support the City's conclusion,
nor does it cite any. The City further ignores its own witnesses' qualifications and does
not acknowledge the fact that they were testifying under oath in a criminal trial. The City
even refuses to acknowledge the trial court's sentencing observation that Christensen had
7

something wrong with him at the time of the incident, that he appeared to be suffering
from some type of mental illness - even encouraging him to seek professional treatment
for his mental condition. R155:205. Again, simply choosing to ignore record facts
unfavorable to the City's position does not change them.
Contrary to what the City claims (Br. Appe. 28), Christensen is not asking and
has not ever asked this Court to make a factual finding that Christensen was suffering
from a mental illness during the incident in this case. Christensen did argue: (1) It was
prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor to inform the jury that the defendant's mental
state was no defense to the charges; and it was plain error for the trial court not to correct
this misstatement of the law; and (2) Christensen's counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to object to the prosecutor's misstatement, and in failing to
investigate and raise a mental illness defense in light of the overwhelming evidence that
Christensen lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes for which he was charged.
Br. Appt. 20-32. Therefore, the City has completely misconstrued Christensen's
arguments and thereby misapprehended its burden of proof.
Accordingly, Christensen's arguments in his opening brief are sufficient and will
not be reiterated here. Indeed, in trying to rebut Christensen's arguments, the City
engages in a futile post-trial exercise of trying to prove from the evidence that
Christensen had no mental illness. In short, the City tries to qualify itself as an expert on
Christensen's mental state simply by reading the transcript and relying on its own non-
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expert evaluation of those portions of the record it chooses to acknowledge, while
minimizing or completely ignoring those record facts not in harmony with its non-expert
opinion. Br. Appe. 20-32.
Further, the City's claim that Christensen failed to perfect his appeal by not
filing a Rule 23B motion for remand is similarly without merit. In claiming Christensen
should have filed a motion for 23B remand, the City neglects to point out what evidence
is purportedly missing from the record that is needed. It merely makes vague references
to "affidavits showing the claimed deficient performance of [Christensen's] trial counsel"
and "a proposed order identifying the ineffectiveness claims and specifying the relevant
factual issues to be addressed on remand" and "an extant competency evaluation." Those
points would have merit if Christensen had filed a motion for 23B remand that was
defective. Christensen has not done so, and it is unnecessary.
There is adequate evidence on the record to consider this issue of counsel's
ineffectiveness. Indeed, deficient performance is manifest on the record. It is clear from
the record that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she misinformed the jury on
the law; it is also clear that Christensen's counsel did not object to this statement.
R155:197. Therefore, a 23B remand on this issue would be superfluous at best.
It is also clear from the record that there was substantial evidence from the
City's own witnesses that Christensen lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes
and that Christensen's counsel did not investigate or present what would have proven to
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be a complete defense to the charges if in fact the City's witnesses' conclusions were
correct - that Christensen was in shock, psychotic, irrational, and hallucinating when the
incident occurred. R155:55, 57, 65, 96, 100, 106, 108-10, 117-19, 129, 145, 147, 158-60,
164. Christensen's counsel clearly did not investigate this evidence or present any
defense that Christensen lacked the requisite mental state to commit the crimes.
As even the City asserts, "The law of the case at trial was that mental illness was
not affirmatively raised and developed as a defense, either by defense counsel or as
reflected in the jury instructions." Br. Appe. 33. Christensen concurs with this
conclusion. The record demonstrates that Christensen was likely suffering from a mental
illness at the time of the incident that may have negated the requisite intent. And as the
City concedes, the record also demonstrates that defense counsel did not raise this defense
or provide a jury instruction relative to the issue. In light of the facts and circumstances
of this case and the compelling evidence on the record, there is more than enough
evidence to conclude that Christensen's counsel rendered deficient performance.
Moreover, the City has neglected to even argue that Christensen was not
prejudiced by the prosecutor's misstatement of the law, thereby failing to meet its burden
of proof. See, Br. Appt. 26 ("Once prosecutorial misconduct is established, it is the
State's burden to show that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa,
720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n.21 (Utah 1986). Further, all reasonable doubts are to be
resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977)").
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Christensen respectfully requests this Court to vacate
his convictions and to remand this matter for a new trial on the charge of disorderly
conduct.

Respectfully submitted this \tffi day of July, 2006.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

Jennifer K. Gowans
Attorneys for Appellant
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